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fund is here. It is, therefore, suggested that a statute be enacted to
extend the trust fund benefits to those who deposit money in New
York for the improvement of foreign realty.

X
LIQUOR LICENSE REFUND-PRIORITY OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S

LIEN OvER EQUITABLE AssIGNMENT.-Bedford Bar and Grill re-

ceived a loan from appellant bank for renewal of its liquor license.
The bank received as security an assignment of any refund that might
become due from surrender of the license, under Section 127(1) of
the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.1 Upon default, the
bank filed the assignment with the State Comptroller and then Bedford surrendered the license. Subsequently, the City of New York
docketed a warrant for taxes due against Bedford - and then, in
supplementary proceedings,3 obtained a judgment creditor's lien on
the refund. The Court of Appeals held the bank's assignment to be
subordinate to the lien of the City. City of New York v. Bedford
Bar and Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1957).
Assignments of choses in action have long been recognized in
equity.4 In New York, even if the property assigned did not exist
in praesenti, but had only a potential existence, the assignor was still
bound. 5 When the property did come into esse, the equitable title to
it would mature, and vest in the assignee. 6 • Hence his rights were
enforced even against a creditor who had obtained a judgment after
I "If a person holding a license to traffic in alcoholic beverages ...

shall

voluntarily... cease to [do so] ... during the term for which the license fee

is paid, such person may surrender such license to the liquor authority for
cancellation and refund ... ." N.Y. Awo. BEy. CONTROL LAw § 127(1).
2 ".
[.T]he chief fiscal officer may issue a warrant.., for the payment
of the amount [of taxes due] .... [After it is docketed] the sheriff shall...
proceed upon the warrant in the same manner and with like effect as that
provided by law in respect to executions against property upon judgments of
a court of record... ." N.Y. Gax. CiTy LAw § 24-a (§ 10(b)).
3 "The attorney for the judgment creditor may at any time within two
years from the date of such judgment, issue a subpoena directed to a third party
.. where such attorney has reason to believe that such third party has property of the judgment debtor exceeding ten dollars ... requiring the attendance
of such third party for examination . . . whether or not such ... money...
appears to belong to or to be due to a person or corporation other than the
judgment debtor." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 779(2).
4 See Stover v. Eycleshimer, 3 Keyes 620 (N.Y. 1867); Meechett v. Bradshaw, Nels 22, 21 Eng. Rep. 779 (Ch. 1633); Earl of Suffolk v. Greenvill,
2 Freem. 146, 22 Eng. Rep. 1119 (Ch. 1631).
5 See Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889).
6 Stover v. Eycleshimer, 46 Bar. 84 (N.Y. 1865), aff'd, 3 Keyes 620 (N.Y.
1867).
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the assignment, but before the fund came into being.7 The creditor
was limited to the judgment debtor's interest in the property 8 and
hence, like a subsequent assignee of a chose in action, his rights were
subordinate to the previous assignment.9 This was true, with the
exception of those specific cases dictated by public policy,10 even if the
creditor had obtained a lien on the assigned future property. 1
But the lower courts have not applied this doctrine to assignments
of liquor license refunds. 12 In Alchar Realty Corp. v. Meredith
Restaurant,13 a creditor who had procured a judgment before the
emergence of the fund was given priority over a previous assignee.
The court reasoned that when the fund became payable the assignee's
title was enforceable in equity, and then only as against the assignor.
While later cases agreed in this result, they did so because, at the time4
of the judgment, no fund susceptible of assignment was in existence.1
However, it was not until 1943 that the Court of Appeals answered
the question of when the fund began to exist. 15 Strand v,. Piser16
held that this occurred at the surrender of 17the license, not at the
presentation of the receipt to the Comptroller.
In Matter of Gruner,'8 the proceeds of any future sale of a stock
exchange seat were assigned as security. After the assignor's death
and the sale of the seat, the State of New York sued for taxes owed
for 1933 and 1937.19 The court stated that at the time of the assignI Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882).

8 Id. at 523. It is the duty of the assignee to notify the debtor of the
assignment, for without notice, the latter is not liable if he makes payment to
another assignee. See Wangner v. Grimm, 169 N.Y. 421, 62 N.E. 569 (1902);
Heermans v. Ellsworth, 64 N.Y. 159 (1875).
9 See Williams v. Ingersoll, supra note 7, at 523.
10 See Williams v. Ingersoll, supra note 7, at 519. See, e.g., Zartman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907), where it was held that
the claim of a mortgagee of after-acquired chattels was subordinate to the
claims of subsequent creditors. The reason for this rule was to protect these
creditors who loaned money in reliance upon the borrower-mortgagor's stock
in trade (which they at least indirectly furnished) from having the proceeds
of their credit go to the mortgagee, and as a result not be able to collect their
debt. See also Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632
(1894), where a similar rule was applied to mortgages of future crops.
11 See Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900).
12 Such an assignment has been recognized as enforceable. N.Y. ATr'Y GEN.
REP. 149 (1935).
13 256 App. Div. 853, 8 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't 1939) (mem. opinion).
14 See, e.g., Matter of Guarino, 285 App. Div. 1161, 140 N.Y.S.2d 370 (2d
Dep't 1955) (mem. opinion); Frank v. Lutton, 267 App. Div. 703, 48 N.Y.S.2d
137 (3d Dep't 1944); Palmer v. Tremaine, 259 App. Div. 951, 20 N.Y.S.2d
145 (3d Dep't 1940) (mem. opinion).
15 See Strand v. Piser, 291 N.Y. 236, 52 N.E.2d 111 (1943).
16 Ibid.
17 See Palmer v. Tremaine, note 14 supra.
1s295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947).
19 The United States also claimed satisfaction for income taxes owed for
1933 and 1941. The court held that the government, by virtue of statute
[Rnv. STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952)] had a right of priority in
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ment, the assignee had received an "inchoate equitable lien" 20 on the
proceeds of the sale which attached to the fund when it became available to the assignor's administratrix. Thereupon, the assignee's lien
was immediately perfected and he became a secured creditor. Because
the state had not enforced its claim 21 before the assignee's lien had
so matured, it was held subordinate. Upon remand,22 new evidence
showed that the state actually did file a claim with the administratrix
before the fund became available for payment, and it was awarded
the money.
In the instant case, the Court indicated that the general rule in
this area is that-:
•.. as between a judgment creditor's lien and the equitable lien of an assignee
of property subsequently to be acquired, the latter, while his rights will be
enforced23 in equity as against his assignor, has no right at all as against the
former.
24
The Court maintained that this rule was applied in the Gruner case
25
when, on remand, the State was given priority. However, it was

payment which arose at the moment of the death of the assignor, and not a
lien.2 0 Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 520-21, 68 N.E.2d 514, 519-20 (1947).
Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 518, 68 N.E.2d 514, 518 (1947). An
equitable lien arises from a contract, express or implied, which deals with a
debt in favor of one and against the other contracting party and which shows
the intent of the assignor to transfer a particularly described fund as security.
See Fiore v. Smith, 96 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1950). When the presence
of these elements is clear to the court, equity will give to the transaction the
result that it was intended to produce and will enforce the promise where
no paramount rights intervene. In re Friedlander's Estate, 178 Misc. 65,
32 N.Y.S2d 991 (Surr. Ct. 1941). Hence an equitable lien is available only
to one without notice, active or constructive. Elar Development Co. v. Sullivan
County, 279 App. Div. 949, 110 N.Y.S.2d 869 (3d .Dep't 1952).
21"At common law the crown of Great Britain, by virtue of a prerogative
right, had priority over all subjects for the payment out of a debtor's property
of all debts due it . . . whether the property remained in the hands of the
debtor, or had been placed in the possession of a third person . .. (and] could
be defeated . . . only through the passing of title to the debtor's property,
absolutely or by way of lien, before the sovereign sought to enforce his
right . . . . The first constitution of . . . New York . . . provided that the
common law of England . . . should be and continue the law of the State.
. . . [Hence] the State . . . succeeded to the crown's prerogative right of
priority ...
to all debts due to the State ....
" Marshall v. New York, 254
U.S. 380, 382-83 (1920).
22 Matter of Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
23 City of New York v. Bedford Bar and Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33,
141 N.E.2d 575, 576 (1957). The test of an equitable assignment is the inquiry whether or not the assignment makes an appropriation of the fund so that
the debtor would be justified in paying the debt or the assigned part to the
person claiming to be the assignee. Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179,
128 N.E. 113 (1920). As to an equitable lien, see note 20 .supra.
24 Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947).
25 Matter of Gruner, note 22 supra.
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the dissent's interpretation of Gruner 26 that the judgment lienor
would have priority only if its lien had been perfected first. They
also restricted the application of the majority's "general rule" to
28
pledges of future crops 27 and mortgages of after-acquired property.
That rule would not apply here where there is an assignment of a
future fund which is to arise out of a present property right, and
which was originally advanced by the assignee. However valid this
may appear,2 9 the law now seems to be that an assignment of afteracquired property is inferior to a subsequent judgment creditor's lien.
This is true even if the property
had come into existence before the
30
creditor's lien was obtained.
Absent successful legislative action,3 ' we may expect a decrease
in the use of such assignments of future property as security, since
such assignees will never be "secured" unless they enter into litigation. One wonders if justice, and business, would not be better served
by giving priority to the first perfected claim. 32

MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP-LICENSE DENIAL ON GROUNDS
OF INDECENcY-HELD INVALID. -The
New York State Board of

Regents unanimously denied a license ' to exhibit the film Garden of
26 See Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947); Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
27 Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894).
28 Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
29 It is to be noted that the reason for the "general rule" (see note 11 supra)
actually does not apply. Only the proceeds of the assignee's extension of credit
are governed by the assignment. Hence the proceeds of the property furnished
6y subsequent creditors do not go to the assignee.
As to the correct interpretation of Matter of Gruner, it is important to
note that the state made no claim for taxes due for 1942 since it had not filed
a claim for them until after the perfection of the assignee's lien. Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 473, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (Surr. Ct. 1947). Also, Chief
Judge Conway, who concurred with the dissent in the instant case, wrote the
majority opinion in the Gruner case.
30 City of New York v. Bedford Bar and Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d
575 (1957).
31 In 1953, 1954 and 1955, the legislature introduced bills to give priority to
bank-assignees. While both houses passed the bills in 1954 and 1955, the governor vetoed them without memoranda. See City of New York v. Bedford
Bar and Grill, supra note 30, at 434, 141 N.E.2d at 577. This could be construed
to mean that the legislature attempted to either nullify the lower court decisions
in this area, or to change the existing law as expressed by the majority in the
instant case.
32 See Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947); Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
1N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122, which provides that the Regents may refuse a
license to exhibit if it finds the motion picture to be

".

.

. obscene, indecent,

immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime. ... "

